Macedonia’s Ohrid Framework Agreement Reexamined in Response to Internal and External Crises: Reason for Cautious Optimism on Europe’s Southeastern Border

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In recent years, a number of variables put Macedonia at an increased risk of instability. These factors include Macedonia’s tense relationship with Greece, the strain posed by the European migration crisis, the potential for domestic interethnic conflict, and Macedonia’s recent government scandals. Because of the security risks that an unstable Macedonia poses to the European Union, it is crucial for the EU to seek new ways to ensure Macedonia remains stable. This Note assesses the continued durability of the current set of legal tools – most importantly the framework established by the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (“Ohrid”) – to cope with the increased strain posed by recent destabilizing crises in Macedonia.

What OLC Missed: Anwar al-Aulaqi and the Case for Citizenship Forfeiture

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As the nature of terrorism changes, so does the government’s response to the issue. This Note discusses one of the most significant changes undertaken by allied nations to address the terrorist threat. Western States have slowly adopted some form of citizenship revocation to address the threat of homegrown terrorism. Through the lens of the Anwar al-Aulaqi case, this Note argues that the Office of Legal Counsel should view a particular class of individuals as having forfeited the right to their U.S. citizenship as a result of their involvement in foreign terrorist activities.

Creating a Legal Framework for Terrorism Defectors and Detainees in Somalia

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Through multiple interviews with people working in Somalia on the national program for rehabilitating and reintegrating former terrorists, this Note maps out the current legal framework for handling terrorists and evaluates its effectiveness. It concludes that, while the current programs in Somalia are a positive step and likely to be more effective than traditional counter-terrorism models, there is still a need to ensure adequate safeguards for disengaging terrorists.

Rethinking the Employment Status of Refugees in the United States

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A change in the policy of barring refugees from jobs in the U.S. Federal Civil Service could mitigate challenges for the refugee population. The current policy is misguided from a humanitarian and economic perspective and potentially unconstitutional as it may be in conflict with U.S. obligations under the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.

Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS: A New Look at Foreign Direct Investments to the US

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The CFIUS process typically occurs privately and opaquely, but Ralls Corporation brought a legal challenge in federal courts resulting from an unfavorable ruling. Though full resolution did not ultimately occur, the first and only CFIUS suit in history opened the door for future litigation and substantially strengthened investors’ rights.

Foreign Assistance Complicity

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In 2013, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY sent shockwaves through international legal circles when it ruled that “neutral” support to armed groups engaged in combat activities could not give rise to criminal responsibility absent evidence that the support was “specifically directed” toward the group’s unlawful activities. This Article contributes to the debate over the foreign assistance cases by questioning two of its key premises: the pervasive assumption that the resolution of these cases can and should be determined by recourse to the kind of precedential analysis that has dominated judicial consideration of international aiding and abetting cases, and the assumption that the resolution of individual foreign assistance cases turns on the particular doctrinal choices that have divided judges and commentators.

International Dealmaking at the White House: Toward a Viable Test of Allowable Sole Executive Agreements

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The Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur,” represents the only instance in which the Constitution describes a process by which the U.S. can conclude international agreements. This Note explores when the President may nevertheless lawfully enter “sole executive agreements” without the assent of a supermajority of the Senate.