A change in the policy of barring refugees from jobs in the U.S. Federal Civil Service could mitigate challenges for the refugee population. The current policy is misguided from a humanitarian and economic perspective and potentially unconstitutional as it may be in conflict with U.S. obligations under the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.
A renewed effort is required to reform India’s civil aviation regulatory system based on the CAAI Act or an improved alternative. At the very least, legislative action is required to build a legal framework to support the rising flight path of India’s economy.
Two important new books examine how the law and the nature of war have changed since 9/11. Neither paints a rosy picture.
Digital Destruction: Applying the Principle of Non-Intervention to Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Manifesting No Physical DamageBy: William Mattessich
The principle of non-intervention provides one avenue for applying current international law to DDoS attacks that are not immediately physically destructive. Under the principle of non-intervention, such attacks would be internationally unlawful if they amounted to coercion of the target state.
Brexit demands a new effort to communicate a vision of national identity empowered through supra-national networks just as it forces Europe to reevaluate and salvage its most important post-war political accomplishment.
The CFIUS process typically occurs privately and opaquely, but Ralls Corporation brought a legal challenge in federal courts resulting from an unfavorable ruling. Though full resolution did not ultimately occur, the first and only CFIUS suit in history opened the door for future litigation and substantially strengthened investors’ rights.
In 2013, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY sent shockwaves through international legal circles when it ruled that “neutral” support to armed groups engaged in combat activities could not give rise to criminal responsibility absent evidence that the support was “specifically directed” toward the group’s unlawful activities. This Article contributes to the debate over the foreign assistance cases by questioning two of its key premises: the pervasive assumption that the resolution of these cases can and should be determined by recourse to the kind of precedential analysis that has dominated judicial consideration of international aiding and abetting cases, and the assumption that the resolution of individual foreign assistance cases turns on the particular doctrinal choices that have divided judges and commentators.
Corporate governance literature usually refers to enforcement superiority to explain the premium that foreign firms enjoy when cross-listing in U.S. stock exchanges. This Article casts doubt on this hypothesis by analyzing two comparative case studies of private and public enforcement actions taken against securities fraud in the United States and in Brazil. The case studies show that U.S. enforcement was superior in terms of private shareholder financial recovery but inferior when it came to public discipline and out-of-pocket liability costs for corporate actors.
This Article identifies an emerging regime complex in the field of international criminal law and analyzes the development of the regional criminal court to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. This Article discusses how the International Criminal Court’s institutional crisis created a space for regional innovation. It finds that regime complexes can form not only due to strategic inconsistencies as discussed in the literature, but also because of the influence of regional integration.
International Dealmaking at the White House: Toward a Viable Test of Allowable Sole Executive AgreementsBy: Joshua Abbuhl
The Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur,” represents the only instance in which the Constitution describes a process by which the U.S. can conclude international agreements. This Note explores when the President may nevertheless lawfully enter “sole executive agreements” without the assent of a supermajority of the Senate.