Could a Code of Conduct Work? The Prospects of the French Proposal Limiting the Veto on the United Nations Security Council

During the opening session of the Sixty-Eighth United Nations General Assembly in 2013, President François Hollande of France proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council should agree to “renounce their veto powers” in situations of mass atrocities. Two years later, President Hollande went one step further and officially committed France to this voluntary “code of conduct.” Proposals to reform the Security Council veto have existed ever since the United Nations began in 1945, but could this code of conduct work? And, if so, how? This paper assesses the “French Proposal” and its prospects for success. It does so by examining the legal framework surrounding the veto power and why previous attempts to reform the veto have failed. It then considers how the French Proposal might be different, highlighting more recent changes that have occurred in the wider political context. Finally, the paper considers how the proposal might work in practice and, more importantly, which aspects need to be further defined. Download [171.53...

The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgment Recognition Law

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The substantive law of judgments recognition in the United States has evolved from federal common law, found in a seminal Supreme Court opinion, to primary reliance on state law in both state and federal courts. While state law often is found in a local version of a uniform act, this has not brought about true uniformity, and significant discrepancies exist among the states. These discrepancies in judgments recognition law, combined with a common policy on the circulation of internal judgments under the United States Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, have created opportunities for forum shopping and litigation strategies that result in both inequity of result and inefficiency of judicial process. These inefficiencies are fueled by differences regarding (1) substantive rules regarding the recognition of judgments, (2) requirements for personal and quasi in rem jurisdiction when a judgment recognition action is brought (recognition jurisdiction) and (3) the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in judgments (and arbitral award) recognition cases. Recent cases demonstrate the need for a return to a single, federal legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Doubly Uncooperative Federalism and the Challenge of U.S. Treaty Compliance

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This Article explores the undertheorized and understudied phenomenon of doubly uncooperative federalism. While most commentary examining the behavior of U.S. states with respect to treaty regimes focuses on cooperative behavior—that is, states that aid in the implementation of duly ratified treaties, or even aid in the implementation of treaties that the federal government has yet to ratify—this Article focuses on settings of doubly uncooperative federalism.