Letters from the Front Lines: State Communications to the U.N. Security Council During Conflict

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This Article analyzes state communications to the United Nations Security Council during episodes of serious interstate conflict. I hypothesize that overall state communications should have increased after the Cold War; that states should be advancing more diverse legal justifications for their uses of force; and that states should be focusing more on the jus in bello than during the Cold War. An analysis of several hundred state communications drawn from a fifty-year period provides only limited support for these hypotheses. Patterns in state justifications to the Security Council have not changed markedly, and states remain overwhelmingly focused on self-defense as a legal justification.

Dangerous Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Reform of the U.N. Security Council

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This Article responds to current literature, which unitarily advocates for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform solution to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) deadlock, particularly in the context of the situation in Syria. This Article argues, contra the consensus, that a reformed UNSC would hinder the crystallization of R2P as a customary norm and its application to humanitarian crises.

Transatlantic (F)RANDs and Converging Standards: Finding Balance Between Jurisdictions in International Standard Setting

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The Microsoft v. Motorola cases in U.S. federal court and transformative developments in enforcement activity by the European Commission antitrust authorities have created a new dynamic intersection between competition and intellectual property law. This legal juncture focuses on a patent holder’s “reasonable and non-discriminatory,” or RAND, commitments to standard setting organizations.

When Charity Meets Racism: The Story of Cy Pres in the United States and England

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This Note examines the history of the cy pres doctrine in U.S. and English law of charitable trusts. This doctrine is the main means by which a charitable trust can be altered if it has become illegal, impracticable, or impossible to maintain it in its original form. This Note finds that, while the doctrine was essentially identical in the United States and in England until well into the twentieth century, U.S. courts are now far more willing to alter charitable trusts than they were originally, while the approach of English courts has hardly changed.