Sudan v. United Arab Emirates and Sudan’s Legacies of Genocide
Refugee camp in Chad sheltering Sudanese displaced by conflict, May 16, 2023.
By: Jehanne Henry; Lecturer-in-Law, UN Externship Co-Instructor
Nearly two years into a devastating war, the two warring sides —the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—have committed horrific crimes against civilians, which the UN, rights groups and media have reported extensively. The war has all but destroyed the capital Khartoum and other cities and towns; a staggering 12 million people have had to flee their homes; and famine has set in in at least 10 areas. The death toll is now estimated to be more than 150,000.
Earlier this month, on March 6, 2025, Sudan filed an application to initiate a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for violations of the Genocide Convention. It alleges that the UAE, “through its direction of and provision of extensive financial, political and military support for the rebel RSF militia,” is complicit in genocide. It requests provisional measures ordering the UAE to take “all measures within its powers” to prevent genocide and related crimes of conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and complicity in genocide.
The application focuses on events in West Darfur, where RSF and allied militias attacked ethnic Masalit communities. International media and human rights groups detailed these crimes—one even concluded that the RSF and allied militia committed genocide and that the UAE was complicit because of its support to the RSF. In January 2025, the Biden Administration determined that the RSF had committed genocide there, and sanctioned its leader.
The bitter irony in this application should not be lost on anyone. Twenty years ago, Sudanese army and militia drawn from the same Darfuri Arab groups that make up the RSF carried out scorched earth campaigns across the region and attacked ethnic groups including the Masalit in West Darfur. At the time, the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labelled the atrocities a genocide. The UN referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which later issued arrest warrants for six men, including then-president Omar al-Bashir—the first president to face genocide charges.
Since then, the Sudanese government has consistently refused to cooperate with the ICC, even after al-Bashir was deposed from office in the midst of pro-democracy protests in 2019. But the ICJ judges will not likely get to consider Sudan’s legacies of genocide in Darfur or how the past atrocities contributed to current ones. The doctrine of “clean hands”—the notion that a state may not bring a claim for wrongdoing linked to its own past wrongdoing—would not seem to apply.
ICJ judges may not hear the merits at all. As many others noted after Sudan submitted its application, the ICJ is not likely to find it has jurisdiction over the case because the UAE, upon ratification of the Convention, made a reservation to Article IX, the compromissory clause that grants the Court jurisdiction over disputes related to the Convention. The ICJ set hearings for Sudan’s request for provisional measures on April 10, and judges could decide they do not have prima facie jurisdiction even at this early stage.
Sudan argues that the reservation is invalid because it conflicts with the “object and purpose” of the treaty, citing the ICJ’s 1951 advisory opinion. Some scholars agree, pointing to the unique nature of the Convention as expressing erga omnes partes obligations (duties owed to all), and that the ICJ is the only avenue for holding states accountable for the “crime of all crimes.” In their joint separate opinion in DRC vs Rwanda, four judges agreed there are questions surrounding the validity and effect of reservations that the Court should revisit.
The ICJ has acknowledged the uniqueness of this Convention. In recent years, it has taken an expansive view of standing, noting the erga omnes nature of the Convention and the need for redress, and has admitted claims by third countries that have no direct interest in the case as in Gambia v. Myanmar and South Africa v. Israel. However, the Court has not considered direct challenges to the validity of Art. IX reservations, and has dismissed cases on the basis of them.
Sudan’s application may be best viewed as an effort to publicize RSF abuses and the UAE’s malign role in the conflict. Activists have urged the Global South to support it and hold the UAE accountable. It’s worth noting that if a state party to the Convention seeks to influence the Court’s reasoning, it could seek to intervene (ICJ Statute, arts 62, 63). Such declarations have become hugely popular in cases involving the Convention, though not without controversy and complications. It may be too late for interventions in this case, however, if the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction to proceed.